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THE STANDARD APPLIED BY THE TRIAL JUDGE 
REGARDING THE STOP OF THE VEHICLE WAS THE 
CORRECT STANDARD, AND, THERE WAS A SUBSTANTIAL 
VIOLATION OF DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
WHETHER OR NOT COMMITTED IN GOOD FAITH/BAD FAITH. 12 
THE DEFENDANTS DID HAVE "STANDING" i.e. A 
REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN THE 
VEHICLE IN WHICH THEY WERE RIDING AND LEGALLY 
POSSESSED ALLOWING THEM TO CHALLENGE THE STOP 
SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE 24 
THE STATEMENTS ELICITED FROM BOTH THE DRIVER 
AND PASSENGER BY THE BORDER PATROL OFFICERS AT 
THE TIME THE VEHICLE WAS STOPPED OBTAINED 
WERE IN VIOLATION OF MIRANDA V. ARIZONA INASMUCH 
AS DEFENDANTS WERE BEING "DETAINED" AND NOT FREE 
TO LEAVE THE SCENE AT THE TIME THE STATEMENTS 
WERE MADE. THE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE DEFENDANTS 
WERE THE PREDICATE FOR THE LATER ARREST AND 
SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE 27 
WHETHER THE TRIAL JUDGE'S FAILURE TO SPECIFY 
THAT THE OFFICERS ACTED IN BAD FAITH IS NOT 
FATAL ALTERNATIVELY, A SIMPLE REMAND BACK TO 
THE TRIAL COURT TO MAKE A REQUIRED FINDINGS 
WOULD SUFFICE RATHER THAN REVERSAL 28 
THE FINDINGS BY THE TRIAL JUDGE ARE NOT 
REQUIRED AT ALL IF THIS COURT FINDS THAT RULE 
12(g) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND IN VIOLATION OF 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION FOURTH AMEND-
MENT IN THAT IT SETS A LOWER STANDARD THAN 
THE MINIMUM SET BY THE UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT 
THE BORDER PATROL AGENTS HAD NO LEGAL 
AUTHORITY TO STOP THE MUSTANG WITH OR WITHOUT 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
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-v-
ALDOLPHO DIAZ MENDOZA and 
ALBERTO RUIZ MENDIETA, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 20922 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Respondent Mendieta views the following issues as 
being presented by the Interlocutory Appeal: 
1. The trial court's failure to make findings under Utah 
R. Crim. P. 12(g)% 
a. Whether the trial court implicitly made such 
findings based on the outrageous conduct of the 
Border Patrol, and, 
b. Whether Rule 12(g) Utah R. Crim. P. is un-
constitutional as embracing a lower standard of 
search and seizure in violation of the United States 
Constitution Fourth Amendment. 
2. Whether the standard applied by the trial judge in suppress-
ing the evidence based on the illegal stop and search of the vehicle 
was a substantial violation of defendant's rights and, whether 
committed in good faith or bad faith by the arresting officers. 
3. Whether the defendants had "standing" to challenge the 
stop/search of the vehicle? 
4. Whether statements elicited from both the driver and 
passenger of the vehicle by members of the Border Patrol were in 
violation of the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda 
X- Arizonay the defendants having been "detained" and "seized" 
within the Fourth Amendment in that they were not free to leave 
the scene at the time the statements were made and were in "custody" 
at the time the statements were made. 
5. Whether the stop of the vehicle and the detention of the 
defendants was illegal and whether the subsequent interrogation 
followed by the arrest of defendants and the search of the vehicle 
producing the contraband were properly suppressed by the trial 
court. 
6. Whether the mere fact of the trial judge's failure to 
specify verbally that the officers acted in bad faith is fatal to 
his findings, in view of the fact that he found the stop of the 
vehicle and the statements elicited from the defendants,and the 
search of the vehicle illegal and a violation of the United States 
Constitution Fourth Amendment, and, if so whether a simple remand 
back to the trial court to make the required findings would suffice 
rather than a reversal. 
7. Whether such findings are required at all if this court 
finds that Rule 12(g) is unconstitutional and in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant/Respondent Mendieta agrees with the Attorney General's 
statement of the case as outlined in his opening brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant/Respondent Mendieta agrees with the statement of the 
facts as outlined by the Attorney General in his opening brief with 
the following additions and corrections. 
James Stiegler testified at the suppression hearing that he 
was a United States Border Patrol Agent and had been so for ten 
yearsf that his duties on March 16, 1985, in Washington County, 
Utah, was to conduct a traffic check operation on 1-15, explaining 
that a "traffic check operation" was the observing of traffic as 
it passed his vantage point on 1-15. (See SH 47-49) 
Stiegler testified that the point he was parked at had been 
selected because it was a major route for illegal alien traffic 
north from the border, the border being the international border 
with Mexico, and that the border patrol conducts such operations 
on a yearly basis in Utah, that he had previously worked on two 
separate occasions in Nephi, Utah in the apprehension of illegal 
aliens. (See SH 49-50) 
Stiegler testified that the 1-15 in Washington County was 
selected as a vantage point because it is the time of year of peak 
alien activity because of the planting season up north and that 
there was a lot of traffic from the United States Border north, 
that about 4:30 A.M., he was operating a "roving check point" 
observing traffic as it went northward on 1-15, that he noticed 
something unusual at that time, that there were three vehicles 
approaching, and as they went by he was watching two of them and 
Officer Fox told him that he thought the black mustang which had 
passed deserved a second look, that it seemed like the occupants 
were of latin decent. (See SH 50-52) 
The officer along with his partner then followed the mustang 
with Officer Fox driving, that they accelerated rapidly in order to 
catch up with the car, that they observed it remained in the passing 
lane and the occupants did not seem to notice them as they approached, 
andr.pulled in behind them. When the occupants did observe them the 
they pulled over rapidly and slowed down rapidly at which time the 
officer noticed the plates on the mustang were California plates. 
(SH 51-53) The officer described the change from the passing lane 
to the regular driving lane on the part of the mustang as erratic 
in that most of the vehicles that he passed were very aware of his 
presence and did not respond in what Officer Stiegler considered a 
"normal manner" (emphasis ours) (SH 52-54). The officer further 
described the movements of the mustang as being jerky and that the 
mustang remained longer than was necessary in the passing lane and 
decelerated rapidly. (SH 54 Line 11 - 18) 
Stiegler further testified that he felt that a car with California 
or Arizona plates is an indicator that the vehicle is coming from an 
area which may be adjacent to the border, that if the plate had been 
from Colorado or Indiana or New Jersey or one of the other 48 plates 
it wouldn't have been as significant as a state that was located on 
the southern border. (SH 55, line 2-14) Stiegler noticed that neither 
of the occupants of the mustang looked at him, and that both occupants 
were of latin decent, that he made no special note of the clothing 
worn at that time, and that although the occupants of the mustang did 
not look at him he wanted to get a better look into the vehicle and 
make sure that the occupants saw he and his partner and determine what 
their reaction to the officers was, so he told Fox to pull along side 
of them a second time and go all the way up near their front bumper 
so that he could turn around and cross their line of vision and he then 
stared at both of their faces. (SH 57, line 2:58-2) Based on his 
training and experience that the observation of the rigid posture and 
demeanor of the occupants of the mustang was another indicator to him 
that they were probably illegal aliens or transporting illegal aliens. 
(SH 59, line 6 - 20) 
He felt the response by the occupants of the mustang was not 
typical behavior for the average car which he pulls alongside of. 
Stiegler then testified that the reason he stopped the vehicle was 
to determine whether the occupants were illegal aliens. (SH 61, line 
18-22) 
Stielger then testified that after the car was stopped he got 
out of his patrol car and approached the driver and interrogated him 
as to his alienage or citizenship. (SH 53, line 4 - 7 ) The officer 
also determined at this time that the driver was wearing a Mexican 
poncho and that would be unusual for United States citizens. (SH 63-64) 
The driver then admitted to the officer that he was indeed an illegal 
alien and the officer arrested the driver. (SH 64-65) 
On cross-examination Stiegler admitted that he carries out his 
duties pursuant to Statute 237, (Title 8 of the Immigration Act) and 
that that act gives immigration officers the power to interrogate any 
alien or person believed to be an alien anywhere in the United States. 
(SH 67, line 24:68-20) 
Stiegler went on to testify that he did not stop any persons in 
vehicles who appeared to be caucasion, nor blacks, and in fact that 
most of the people going north at that time of the year were Mexicans 
or Mexican-Americans. 
Stiegler also testified that he pulled up at a rapid speed behind 
the mustang, continued at a rapid speed until just behind the vehicle 
and then applied the brakes or slowed his vehicle very quickly, that 
the purpose behind that maneuver was to catch up to the car before 
it got to a group of lights so they could see the interior of the 
vehicle and the occupants, and viewed it as significant that the 
car did not immediately pull over which in the officers view would 
be a "normal" thing to do, admitting though that there were no 
lights blinked by the officers nor were there any red lights put on 
to pull the car over, that their car is a green car, not a black and 
white car and has a decal on the side. (See SH 76 - 78) Admitting 
that the police vehicle would look like any other vehicle to the 
occupants of the mustang, that this maneuver of speeding up at a 
high rate of speed and braking suddenly behind the mustang was per-
formed on a second occasion at which time the mustang did pull over 
to the right at which time the officers followed the mustang to the 
side of the road. (SH 79 - 80) That the officers were three to six 
feet behind the vehicle at a speed of approximately 55 miles an hour, 
and that what the officers characterized as "erratic" driving was 
the fact that the vehicle stayed in the passing lane when there was 
light traffic and that when the officers approach rapidly and follow 
closely behind they still stayed in the passing lane and that when 
they finally moved over their movements were jerky and decelerated 
rapidly. Admitting again that the border patrol car had no special 
lights on, no siren, that none were blinked or waved at the car they 
were following at the time it pulled over. (See SH 79 - 83) 
The officer stated in regard to the California.plates on the 
mustang, that California was a border state with Mexico, although he 
didn't know how much of California bordered on Mexico and had no 
way of telling whether the car was from Northern California, Los 
Angolon, or nny orhor locnrion in Cnli form* n. (STT R5 - 86) 
The officer further stated that cars with California and Texas 
plates would cause him to pay more attention to those vehicles 
especially if there were Mexicans inside. (SH 87, line 3 - 10) That 
when his vehicle pulled along side the mustang he took as significant 
the fact that the occupants did not look back at him as most 
"Americans" would do. (SH 87, line 23 - 88:6) Finally, that the 
decision to stop the vehicle was to ascertain if the occupants were 
illegal aliens or transporters of illegal aliens, and the facts 
supporting that stop was the fact that it had a California plate, 
and the way it pulled over after the officers came up behind it 
quickly and the fact that the car contained two persons of latin 
decent that did not look back at the officers. (SH 91, line 5 -92:6) 
When Stiegler approached the driver's side of the vehicle he 
asked questions of the driver (Mendoza) as to whether or not he was 
a United States citizen, did not ask him for any driver's license or 
identification prior to those questions, was told by Mendoza that he 
was in the United States legally, and that he had papers but had 
left them at home and only then did the officer ask for identification 
which Mendoza was unable to produce, the officer then questioned him 
further as to whether he was an illegal alien and did not advise 
Mendoza of his "Miranda" rights before he asked those questions. 
During this interrogation Mendoza admitted he was an illegal alien 
and was arrested. The trunk of the vehicle was searched and no 
consent was obtained to search the vehicle. (SH 92 - 94) Stiegler 
further admitted on redirect examination that insofar as a "profile 
vehicle" that this particular ford mustang was not, and that the 
fact that the vehicle was not a profile vehicle would not be a factor 
in his consideration in pulling it over. (SH 97 -98) 
Dennis Fox testified as follov/s: 
That he v:as a Border Patrol Agent stationed in Montana on 
temporary duty in the St. George area of Utah, that on the niaht 
in question he was with Officer Stiegler, saw the mustang drive 
by the point at which the officers were sitting, followed it, 
eventually stopped it and does not recall whether he approached 
the driver or the passenger. (SH 102 -103) 
He interrogated the passenger (Mendieta) to see if any 
immigration law had been broken, he asked for documents and status 
etc., from Mendieta, Mendieta replied that he had papers but he 
had left them at home. (SH 104) 
With regard to the stopping of the vehicle, Fox testified that 
he was the driver of the Border Patrol vehicle, that after the 
vehicle had passed that he wanted a better look at it, and when 
asked whether the real reason he wanted to stop the car was because 
the occupants appeared to be Mexican his answer was, he didn't 
know, he just wanted a better look at the car. (SH 107-108) 
In attempting to get this "better look" at the car and the 
occupants Fox testified that he drove up very fast behind the car 
then along side of it at speeds up to 85 miles per hour, that 
when he got up behind them he slowed quickly at which time he was 
within a few feet of the mustang, that he performed this operation 
twice, that on the second occasion the car did pull over to the 
right, that the mustang was not supposed to drive in the passing 
lane, in his opinion, because where Fox comes from people don't 
drive in the passing lane. (See SH 109 -112) 
Fox further stated that he was not enforcing any Utah traffic 
laws and that in his experience when he drives up fast behind a 
vehicle that some people pull over put on the brakes and jump out, 
both citizens and illegal aliens. (SH 113-114) 
When hfe got a better look at the occupants of the vehicle 
he observed they were of latin decent and the "way they looked" 
was significant to him, (SH 115) that they were nervous, 
staring straight ahead, and he "wondered" how many people were in 
the vehicle inasmuch as he could only see two, (SH 115-116) and 
that he wanted to find out if any others were in the car. (SH 117) 
In response to the question as to why he stopped the car, his 
response was that it was a number of things, a combination of the 
route of travel, the time of travel, the time of year, California 
plates on the vehicle and the nervousness of the occupants, (SH 118) 
and that he didn't know if he would have taken the same action if 
there was a caucasion driving the car rather than a latin. (SH 118) 
Regarding the questioning of the driver, Fox stated that he 
did not advise him regarding his Miranda rights before he questioned 
him, "thinks" that he told the driver why he was stopped, but doesn't 
know for sure, asked him his name, where he was from and if he had 
immigration documents, that the driver did not have immigration 
documents. Fox then questioned the passenger (Mendieta), asked him 
if he was a legal or illegal alien, and was told by Mendieta that 
he had left his immigration documents at home, that he was here 
legally, that he checked no further to see where Mendieta's home 
might be or where he could get the papers, assumed there was a 
violation of federal law by the fact that Mendieta had said he 
had no papers on him and further stated that he (Fox) did not 
have a reasonable suspicion in his mind that Mendieta had violated 
the law when he asked the question responding that "no, you don't 
know unless you ask". (See SH 125 - 127) 
Fox also testified that he did not give any Miranda warnings 
prior to his questions of Mendieta. (SH 128) 
Lastly, Fox testified that after both passenger and driver 
were arrested that he (Fox) removed the keys from the mustang, opened 
the trunk, observed the contraband here in issue. (See SH 105-106) 
The above summarizes the testimony at the motion to suppress 
as it relates to the issues decided by the trial court and the 
facts as relating to the "standing" issue are hereby adopted by 
respondent as stated in the Attorney General's brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court hearing the live evidence presemted at the 
motion to suppress, observing the witnesses demeanor on the stand, 
assessing their credibility and taking the case under submission and 
after having read the points and authorities submitted by both sides 
came to the conclusion that the evidence seized pursuant to the 
arrest of the two defendants, and all statements made by those 
defendants subsequent to the stop of their vehicle, should be 
suppressed, finding as a matter of fact that the stop, sea'rch and 
arrest made by the Border Patrol officers, were made as a result of 
a roving patrol, but the stop was made without probable cause and 
was conducted in an unreasonable manner by the Border Patrol officers. 
The court further found that each defendant had standing to 
raise the issue of the legality of the stop (had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the contents of the vehicle), were law-
fully and legally in possession of the automobile, and had exclusive 
use and possession of the automobile by virtue of the previous 
permission granted to the driver and passenger to be in and occupying 
the vehicle on the date of the arrest. 
Although the trial court used the words "probable cause", 
the court also used the words "no basis" which could be viewed 
as no "reasonable suspicion". The terminology reasonable suspicion 
being in the view of some, a lesser standard than that of probable 
cause, nevertheless, the word "basis" as used by the trial court 
could be interpreted to be synonymous with the words reasonable 
suspicion and therefor the court's application of either test to 
the facts before it was proper• 
As to the legal nicety of whether or not the stop/search/seizure 
arrest of defendants was a "substantial" violation of their con-
stitutional rights, it should be obvious from the facts elicited 
at the motion to suppress and the conduct of the officers in deciding 
to and making the stop in the manner in which they did approaching 
at the enormously high rates of speed within a few feet of the vehicle 
and then asserting that because the occupants then moved over to 
the right hand side of the road in somewhat erratic manner that this 
supplied some additional factor of probable cause is ludicrous. To 
accept that interpretation would allow the officers to "manufacture 
their own probable cause" by their own outrageous conduct and then 
benefit from that conduct by asserting that the response to that 
outrageous conduct gave rise to suspicion of illegal activity. 
The Border Patrol officers on duty at the so-called checkpoint 
between the borders of Arizona and Utah, many hundreds of miles from 
both the Canadian and Mexican border had no legal authority to enforce 
Utah's laws, and certainly under the Federal Rules allowing at most 
some enforcement authority within a 100 air miles of the borders of 
the Continental United States would not empower the officers from 
the Border Patrol to take any action with regards to "roving patrols" 
in a search for illegal aliens in a location where this stop was 
made. 
In addition, Rule 12(g) is unconstitutional as setting a lower 
standard than that required by the United States Supreme Court and 
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. As will be 
discussed later in this brief, states can set a higher standard 
if they wish, for Fourth Amendment protections, but cannot, in any 
event set a lower standard than that set by the federal government 
and the United States Supreme Court. It is respondent's opinion 
that the court will not have to reach that issue and resolve the 
constitutionality of Rule 12(g), that this case can be decided on 
other bases rendering a decision on the constitutionality Rule 12(g) 
unnecessary. 
Finally, it is clear from the facts in this case that both 
respondents, Mendieta and Mendoza, were detained at the time of the 
stop by the Border Patrol, that they were not free to leave, and 
that therefore the interrogation by the officers of both the driver 
and passenger of the car which resulted in the admissions that they 
were illegal aliens, and therefore justified their arrest and 
theoretically the later seizure, were in violation of the require-
ments of Miranda v. Arizona and therefore the statements being 
inadmissible the later arrests of respondents and the subsequent 
search of the vehicle should be suppressed as the result of and the 
fruit of the earlier illegally obtained statements. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT :r 
THE STANDARD APPLIED BY THE TRIAL JUDGE REGARDING THE STOP 
OF THE VEHICLE WAS THE CORRECT STANDARD, AND, THERE WAS 
A SUBSTANTIAL VIOLATION OF DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
WHETHER OR NOT COMMITTED IN GOOD FAITH/BAD FAITH. 
The holding by the trial court that the stop of the defendant's 
vehicle was unlawful was based on a correct standard when it ruled 
that "there was no basis" or probable cause for said officers to 
make the initial stop. . . . (Contrary to the attorney general's 
argument on page 19 of his brief indicating that there were no 
-1 9-
articulable facts as a basis. . . for the officers to make the 
initial stop. 
From the testimony elicited at the motion to suppress it appears 
undisputed that there was no probable cause to arrest the occupants 
of the vehicle nor was there any probable cause to stop the vehicle. 
The "reasonable suspicion test appears to be the proper test to 
apply to the stop of the vehicle under these circumstances, if in 
fact this court determines that the officers had any valid authority 
to do so in the area in which they were working on the evening in 
question. 
The reasonable suspicion test evolves from the case of Almeida-Sanchez 
v. United States of America (1973), 413 US 266, 37 L.Ed.2nd 596, 93 
Supreme Court 2535. In that case the United States Supreme Court 
ruled that a roving patrol some 2_0 miles north of the Mexican border 
in which a vehicle was stopped and searched by Border Patrol officers 
was not justified on grounds urged by the government. 
The government in Almeida-Sanchez, supra, argued that the 
Immigration Nationality Act (INA) Section 287(a)(3) (Attached as 
appendix One) which provides for warrantless searches of autos within 
a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United States 
as authorized by the Attorney General of the United States. 
The Attorney General's regulation defines a reasonable distance 
as within 100 air miles of the border. See 8 CFR-2 87.1. (Appendix 1) 
In Almeida-Sanchez, supra, the court discussed three types of 
surveillance conducted by the Border Patrol regarding illegal aliens: 
1. Permanent check points (Nodal Intersections) 
2. Temporary check points (Various locations-Conducted 
from time to time. 
3. Roving Patrols. 
In construing the Attorney Generalfs regulation authorizing 
searches and stops of vehicles within 100 miles of the border the 
court in Almeida-Sanchez, supra, stated: 
"No act of Congress can authorize a violation of 
the Constitution." 
The court held that the stop/search in this case was: 
1. Not a border search, 2. Not the functional equivalent 
of the border, 3. Not a check point stop, but was a roving patrol 
stop by the Border Patrol officers and therefore probable cause to 
believe persons in the car were aliens was necessary to stop the 
vehicle. 
An interesting argument made by the government in Almeida-
Sanchez at footnote 5 of that opinion was that a stop search on a 
highway which is a common route for illegal aliens to travel was 
valid and that roving patrols had apprehended 195 aliens on that 
road in one year alone. The court's response to that argument was 
that possibly all the others were stopped on valid probable cause 
and that there was no way to tell how many innocent drivers were 
stopped without probable cause and subjected to searches of their 
vehicles. The court then looked to the words of Justice Jackson 
when he returned from the Nuremburg trials, (See 93 Supreme Court 
2540) : 
"These(Fourth Amendment rights), I protest, are 
not mere second-class rights but belong in the 
catalog of indispensible freedoms. Among deprivations 
of rights none is so effective in cowing a population, 
crushing the spirit of the individual and putting 
terror in every heart. Uncontrolled search and seizure 
is one of the first and most effective weapons in the 
arsenal of every arbitrary government." 
See also Brinegar v. United States, 338 US 160. 
Two years later in 1975 the United States Supreme Court ruled 
in United States v. Brignoni Ponce, 422 US 873, 45 L.Ed.2d 607, 
95 Supreme Court 2574, that a roving patrol could stop autos only 
if officers were aware of specific articulable facts that reasonably 
warranted suspicion that autos contained illegal aliens and that the 
Mexican ancestry of the occupants is not sufficient standing alone 
to justify a stop. 
Brignoni Ponce differed from Almeida-Sanchez in that the Border 
Patrol did not claim authority to search cars but did claim the 
authority to stop and question occupants regarding their citizenship 
and immigration status. In Brignoni Ponce the Border Patrol officers 
were working at a fixed check point located at Highway 5, south of 
San Clemente, California, however at the time they observed the 
vehicle in question the check point had been closed because of 
inclement weather. 
The two Border Patrol officers were nevertheless watching the 
northbound traffic from a car on the highway, it was dark and they 
were using their headlights to see into the passing cars. They saw 
a car pass containing three mexicans, stopped it and questioned the 
occupants regarding their status. The questioning of the occupants 
led the officers to believe that they were illegal aliens, they were 
all three arrested and one of them was charged with a violation of 
federal law regarding transportation of illegal aliens. The trial 
court denied a motion to suppress the testimony regarding the 
questions and answers of the occupants at the time of the stop. The 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held this to be a roving patrol rather 
than a fixed check point stop and that the Fourth Amendment forbids 
such a stop for questioning unless on founded suspicion that the car 
contained aliens and that mexican ancestry alone was not a founded 
suspicion. 
At oral argument the government conceded that the stop was a 
roving patrol however, they argued that 10 to 12 million aliens 
were in the United States at that time, that 85 percent of those 
were from Mexico and that it was the Broder Patrol's goal to 
prevent inward movement in the United States and thcit stopping 
automobiles and questioning the occupants as to their status was 
a "modest intrusion" and that all that was required was an answer 
to certain questions of the Border Patrol and production of documents 
showing a right to be in the United States• 
The Supreme Court rejected the government's argument and 
affirmed the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal and in doing so reviewed 
the requirements of Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1, 20 L.Ed,2nd 889, 88 
Supreme Court 1868, regarding the requirements of a pat down search 
for weapons and that the officer in conducting a "Terry" stop must 
reasonably believe that the suspect stopped is armed and dangerous 
and that a pat down search is necessary for his safety, and that 
this believe must be based on specific articulable facts and rational 
inferences based thereon to warrant such a belief. 
The "brief stop" in Terry, suprs, was held to constitute a 
"seizure" under the Fourth Amendment. 
The Supreme Court held in Brignoni Ponce, supra, that when the 
officer's observations lead him to reasonably suspect that the auto 
may contain illegal aliens he may stop the car briefly and investigate 
the circumstances which provoked the suspicion. He may ask the 
driver and passenger regarding their immigration status but any 
further detention or search must be based on probable cause or consent. 
Some of the factors considered in determining whether the officers 
might have probable cause in such a stop are as follows: 
1. The distance from the border to the stop was made, 
2. Information in possession of the officers regarding 
earlier border crossings of this particular car, 
3. The normal pattern of traffic in the area, 
4. The driver's suspicious behavior, 
5. The officerfs observations that the vehicle appears 
to be heavily loaded, 
6. The number of passengers in the car, 
1. Erratic driving, 
8. An attempt to evade the officers when being stopped, 
9. Characteristic appearance of aliens, i.e. mode of dress, 
haircut, etc. 
The court in Brignoni Ponce, supra, also examined the Attorney 
General's regulation (8 CFR 2 87.1(a)) regarding 100 air miles from 
the border being reasonable and held it was not reasonable to make 
such stops on a random basis. (See Appendix 1 ) 
The court also commented that large numbers of native born and 
naturalized citizens, even those living in border areas have the 
same physical characteristics as illegal Mexican aliens, and again 
concluded that Mexican ancestry may be a factor to be considered 
but it was not enough standing alone to justify a stop to inquire. 
Another case which came down in 1975 from the United States 
Supreme Court in which the court examined the relationship between 
a temporary check point and a roving stop was United States of America 
v. Ortiz, 422 US 891, 95 Supreme Court 2585. 
In Ortiz, supra, the Border Patrol was maintaining a check point 
at San Clemente about 62 air miles north of the Mexican border, and 
stopped the car for a routine immigration search at the traffic 
check point. Three aliens concealed in the trunk of the car were 
found and the driver was convicted of transporting aliens. The 
Ninth Circuit reversed on the bais of Almeida-Sanchez, and on review 
the Supreme Court stated that the only question for decision was 
whether or not vehicle searches at traffic check points like the 
roving patrol in Almeida-Sanchez must be based on probable cause. 
See Ortiz, supra, page 2586. 
In holding that the roving patrol and the check point stop 
were identical in sofaras the search of the vehicle was concerned, 
the court held that the regularity, notice to motorists, etc., which 
attended the check point stop did not mitigate the invasion of 
privacy that a search would entail, that motorists whose cars are 
searched unlike those that are only questioned are not reassured by 
seeing that the Border Patrol searches other cars as well. 
In addition the court held they were not pursuaded that the 
check point limits the officer's discretion to select cars for 
search in any meaningful way. 
The court stated at page 2588 in Ortiz" 
"This degree of discretion to search private 
automobiles is not consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment. A search, even of an automobile, 
is a substantial invasion of privacy. 
(Emphasis ours) To protect that privacy from 
official arbitrariness, the court has always 
regarded probable cause as the minimum 
requirement for a lawful search." 
The analysis of the above cases and the current state of the 
law is that a "roving patrol" even on a highway leading directly 
from the border and only 2 0 to 30 miles from Mexico requires 
probable cause in order for the officers to legally stop the vehicle 
(Absent a fixed check point regarded as the "functional equivalent" 
of the border). Further probable cause or consent would be 
necessary in order to search the vehicle, and this is so even if 
the occupants of the vehicle i.e., the driver and passenger were 
arrested validly for being illegal aliens. 
Absent some showing that the vehicle itself was heavily loaded 
or other probable cause to believe that it came directly from the 
border or contained illegal aliens within it would not justify a 
search of the trunk of such a vehicle. 
Other cases have similarly held such stops/searches by roving 
patrols to be invalid even when the proximity of the border is as 
close as three miles. In United States v. Perez, 644 F2d 1299 (1981), 
the Ninth Circuit ruled that customs agents searching a vehicle 
located three miles north of the Mexican border was invalid because 
there was no nexus of the vehicle to the crossing of the border. 
The Ninth Circuit also held that a search of the vehicle known 
to have crossed the border was illegal where the surveillance of 
the vehicle after the crossing of the border was not continuous. 
See United States v. Portillo, 469 F2d 907 (1972). 
Recently the Supreme Court of the State of Utah in the case of 
State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (1985), reversed a conviction of 
burglary on the grounds that the stop and search of the defendant 
which produced evidence previously stolen from a burglary was illegally 
seized. In Swanigan householders had phoned the police when they 
returned home and found out that their home had been burglarized. 
An officer went to investigate and while enroute to the home noticed 
two individuals walking alongside a road. Both individuals allegedly 
"stared" at the officer as he drove by. Later on the officer re-
quested that other officers attempt to locate the two individuals 
he had seen earlier. Approximately two hours later another officer 
spotted the two individuals (fitting the description given by the 
previous officer) about three blocks from the victim's home. This 
officer ordered the two individuals to stop, asked for identification, 
made a warrant check and found out that one of the persons had an 
outstanding traffic warrant. Both were arrested and in the subsequent 
pat down search of the pair some of the jewelry and property taken 
from the victim's home was discovered. 
At trial the defendant challenged his detention under Terry 
v. Ohio, supra, the trial court denied the motion holding that under 
Adams v. Williams, 407 US 143 (1972), that the detention was based 
upon a "reasonable suspicion" on the part of the officers. In 
reversing, the Utah Supreme Court held, quoting from Brown v. Texas, 
443 US 47, 51 (1979), that: 
"A brief investigatory stop of an individual by 
police officers is permissible when the officers 
have a reasonable suspicion based on objective 
facts that the individual is involved in criminal 
activity." 
The court held that the officer who stopped the defendant and 
his companion lacked a reasonable suspicion to believe that they had 
engaged in criminal conduct. The court stated: 
"The stop was based solely on a description by a 
fellow officer who had observed the two earlier 
in an area where many burglaries had been reported, 
Neither officer had observed either of the men 
engaged in an'unlawful or suspicious activity, 
therefore the stop was based on a mere hunch rather 
than the constitutionally mandated reasonable 
suspicion." 
Apropos in the Swanigan case is that no signifigance was given 
to the fact that the two individuals stopped had earlier "stared" 
at the first officer. 
The "automobile search" exception to the warrant requirement 
was first set out in the case of Carroll v. United States, 267 US 
132 (1925). This case involved a violation of the Volstead Act, 
the officer however having ample probable cause to stop the vehicle, 
the defendants previously agreeing to sell liquor to the same federal 
agents in another state. 
Brinegar v. United States, :supra, parallels the Carroll case 
in that when the officers stopped the car the defendant was known 
to them by reputation, had been arrested five months previously 
for illegal transportation of aliens and had been observed loading 
liquor into his car in Missouri, the car also appeared to be heavily 
loaded and it increased its speed in an attempt to evade the officers. 
In United States v. Ross, 456 US 798 (1982) , the Supreme Court 
upheld the search of a bag in a pouch located in the trunk of 
defendant's vehicle because the police had received information from 
and informant that defendant was selling narcotics out of the trunk 
of his car, his physical description and a description of the auto-
mobile and also his alias and a description of the neighborhood 
where he could be found were given to the police. The defendant was 
also observed in the area by means of his license number which re-
sulted in the confirmation of his alias. 
In upholding the search in Ross the Supreme Court again viewed 
the exception to the warrant requirement established in Carroll, supra, 
and reaffirmed that such exception applies only to searches of vehicles 
that are supported by probable cause and that in this class of cases 
a search is not unreasonable if based on facts which would justify 
the issuance of a warrant even though a warrant had not actually been 
obtained. 
In United States v. Rubakava-Montoya, 597 F2d 140 (1978), 
defendant was convicted of transporting illegal aliens having been 
arrested two weeks earlier at the same check point on similar charges. 
On this occasion he got out of his car and walked toward the agent 
with a "dejected" or "hangdog" look on his face. The court held 
that a prior arrest and an unusual demeanor are insufficient facts 
upon which to base probable cause to search. 
In United States v. Loper, 564 F2d 710 (5th Cir. 1977), defen-
dant was convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to distri-
bute. He was stopped in his vehicle at a check point at the 
intersection of two roads, both of which were approximately 55 miles 
from the Mexican border. 
The defendant did not make eye contact with the agents, his 
car was riding high in the back and it was registered in a county 
located 300 miles away. 
The Fifth Circuit held that this evidence was insufficient 
to establish probable cause. The failure to make eye contact with 
law enforcement officers is a commonplace occurrance. The truck 
riding high is the opposite of what would be expected of a car trans-
porting aliens, and persons whose license plates are from out of the 
county or state should be allowed to travel freely without having 
their purposes questioned. 
Loper, supra, parellels the testimony of the Border Patrol 
officers in this case, i.e. that when approaching defendant's 
vehicle neither the driver or the passenger looked back at the 
officers which to the officers was a "suspicious" action on their 
part, and in addition the vehicle they drove carried California 
license plates, a "border state" which further heightened their 
suspicions. 
In conclusion, all the cases cited above regarding roving patrol 
stops by Border Patrol officers indicate that probable cause is 
necessary to affect the stop. Even if this court determines that 
a "reasonable suspicion" standard is appropriate then the facts of 
this case bear out clearly that the officers had no reasonable 
suspicion to stop this vehicle. The testimony of the officers is 
clear in that they wanted to stop the car to "take a second look", 
that they "wondered" if there was anyone else in the car other than 
the driver and the passenger, and that the officers outrageous conduct 
in speeding up to speeds of 80 to 85 miles an hour behind defendant's 
vehicle causing them to pull over to the right side of the road and 
then characterizing that conduct as "erratic" driving is no more 
than a facile attempt to manufacture their own probable cause or 
suspicions and give credence to a "hunch" that they had that the 
occupants of the vehicle might be illegal aliens. There is no 
question that the application of the lowest standard available, 
that of "reasonable suspicion" was applied by the trial court in 
this case when it clearly said it found "no basis" for the stop of 
the vehicle. It would appear then, that there is no magic in the 
words reasonable suspicion when a trial judge finds no basis for the 
stop in question. 
The Attorney General's reliance on State v. Gibson, 665 P.2d 
1302, is misplaced. In Gibson, the defendant was convicted of 
driving with a revoked driver1s license, on the basis of a state 
trooper's stopping him in his automobile, the court holding that the 
trooper had a"reasonable suspicion" that the defendant's driver's 
license was and had been and still was revoked. In Gibson, the 
trooper in question was present when defendant was tried and convicted 
for driving under the influence. On June 1, 1981, the trooper checked 
the defendant's driver's license and found that in fact it had been 
revoked (presumably for a year under Utah law). 
On September 21, 19 81, the trooper observed the defendant 
driving his vehicle and knowing that the driver's license of the 
defendant had been revoked, stopped the defendant to ascertain if 
the license was still revoked. The stop of the defendant was held 
valid by the court in that the officer had unique personal informa-
tion that the defendant in all probability was driver on a revoked 
license. 
There is no question of reasonable suspicion in the Gibson 
case and neither the facts in Gibson nor the application of the 
reasonable suspicion test assists in the determination of the case 
at bench. 
In a recent case the Supreme Court of Utah filed February 4, 
1986, State v. Carpena, 27 Utah ADV. REP. 29, the court upheld in 
a per curiam opinion the suppression of evidence by the District 
Court of narcotics seized by officers. 
In Carpena, supra, a police officer on patrol at 3:00 A.M., 
in a neighborhood which had a high incident of burglaries observed 
a slowly moving automobile with Arizona license plat.es. The officer 
did not observe any criminal or traffic offenses and had no informa-
tion of a report of a burglary on that particular night. The officer 
followed the car for three blocks, then turned on his red lights, 
at which time the car pulled into a driveway belonging to one of 
the occupants of the car. 
After detaining the occupants the officer found an unloaded 
pistol in the vehicle, took the keys from the ignition, opened the 
trunk without consent and found 30 pounds of marijuana in a garment 
bag. 
The Supreme Court in upholding the District Court's suppression 
order and citing Swanigan, supra, found that the police officer had 
no reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory stop, that the 
stop was based merely on the fact that a car with out-of-state plates 
was moving slowly through a residential neighborhood late at night, 
that the officer had no objective facts upon which to base a reason-
able suspicion that the men were involved in criminal activity. 
Carpena is significant in that it would appear that the officer 
in that case had more objective facts upon which to base the stop 
than the Border Patrol officers in the case at bench. 
POINT II 
THE DEFENDANTS DID HAVE A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF 
PRIVACY IN THE VEHICLE IN WHICH THEY WERE RIDING AND 
LEGALLY POSSESSED, ALLOWING THEM TO CHALLENGE THE 
STOP/SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE. 
The Attorney General does not argue the different positions 
of the driver versus the passenger as to the "standing" issue 
and therefore this argument will be addressed only to the question 
of whether the driver (Mendoza) had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the vehicle which he had borrowed from his friend Gomez 
to complain initially of the stop of the vehicle, the manner in 
which in was carried out, the arrest and subsequent search of the 
vehicle. 
The State relies on the case of State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 
1334 (Utah 1984). 
A close reading of Valdez, supra, indicates that the defendant 
in that case was validly stopped when in the early morning hours 
police officers noticed that he and a female companion were driving 
a car which had no front license place (a violation of law), and 
stopped the vehicle to check the driver and his registration. The 
defendant produced a driver's license with his photograph but with 
a false name imprinted upon it and he was validly arrested for that 
offense. 
Upon questioning defendant denied ownership of the car, the 
officers searched the vehicle discovering a briefcase in the trunk 
which contained forged checking materials. 
The Supreme Court in declining to reach the search and seizure 
issues involved in the case decided that based on the defendant's 
statements denying ownership in the car or the briefcase he had 
failed to show any 'legitimate expectation in the effects searched" 
and therefore had no standing to complain of that search. 
In the case at bench, long before the issue of the search of 
the trunk of the vehicle was raised, the defendants challenged the 
propriety of the initial stop and it was discussed earlier in this 
brief. 
There is no question that based on the facts of the stop as 
testified to in the District Court that the judge made a correct 
ruling on that issue. 
With regard to defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the vehicle in which they were riding and the contents of that 
vehicle it appears clear from the testimony that Mendoza had 
received valid permission from the registered owner of the vehicle, 
Gomez, to not only drive the vehicle to Las Vegas but to allow 
defendant Mendieta to ride as a passenger on the way to Colorado, 
Mendieta offering to pay $100 for expenses, i.e. gasoline for the 
trip north. 
Certainly, the two defendants had every right and reason to 
believe that the vehicle in which they were riding and their own 
personal effects in that .vehicle were lawfully in their possession 
and therefore had a reasonable expectation of privacy therein. 
Adopting the Attorney General's argument that an ownership 
interest in the vehicle is necessary and essential to advance the 
theory of a legitimate expectation of privacy, would apparently leave 
all persons who travel by bus, airplane, train, etc., in the position 
of having no "standing" to complain of a search of those vessels in 
that they did not own them but merely riding in them with the 
permission of the carrier. Such a contention is ludicrous and with-
out any basis in common sense. 
The Attorney General argues that the trial court based its 
finding of standing solely on defendant's possession of and presence 
in the vehicle they were driving, but that does not fairly state 
the evidence received by the District Court judge. 
Testimony was taken at the hearing of the motion to suppress 
from defendant Mendoza that he had borrowed the car from Gomez, 
that he had talked to Gomez later from Las Vegas, had obtained 
Gomez1 permission to allow Mendieta to ride along in the car, that 
Mendieta was going to pay expenses for the trip north with a 
further promise that he (Mendoza) would return the car to Los Angeles 
by the following Sunday. 
That evidence was admitted over objection of the county attorney 
who objected on hearsay grounds, however, the classic definition of 
hearsay does not apply to words of direction, consent, permission 
and identification. See Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 801. 
Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 803 defines certain exceptions 
to the hearsay rule, i.e. Rule 803(1) A present sense impression 
describing or explaining an event or condition made while declarant 
was perceiving the event or immediately thereafter. Rule 803(3) 
the statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion 
i.e intent, motive etc. 
See also Wharton Evidence 13th Edition, Volume 2. 
POINT III 
THE STATEMENTS ELICITED FROM BOTH THE DRIVER AND 
PASSENGER BY THE BORDER PATROL OFFICERS AT THE 
TIME THE VEHICLE WAS STOPPED WERE OBTAINED IN 
VIOLATION OF MIRANDA V. ARIZONA INASMUCH AS 
DEFENDANTS WERE BEING "DETAINED" AND NOT FREE TO 
TO LEAVE THE SCENE AT THE TIME THE STATEMENTS 
WERE MADE, SUCH STATEMENTS BEING THE PREDICATE 
FOR THE LATER ARREST OF DEFENDANTS AND THE SEARCH 
OF THE VEHICLE. 
It is clear from the testimony of both Border Parol officers 
that both defendants were interrogated, told to produce papers, 
questioned as to their legal status after the initial stop and prior 
to any search and only upon the answers being given by the defendants 
were they arrested for violation of federal law, i.e. illegal aliens 
in the United States, and it was conceded by both officers that 
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there was no advisement of their right to remain silent prior to 
the interrogation. 
The Attorney General does not address the issues as to the 
statements of the respondents/defendants being in violation of 
Miranda v. Arizona, however the District Court judge in his order 
of suppression specifically ordered all statements made by both 
defendants subsequent to the stop of the vehicle suppressedf therefore, 
the statements of the defendants being the primary if not exclusive 
reason for their arrest and the search of the vehicle following that 
arrest being based the officer's thought "might" be another illegal 
alien in the trunk, it seems clear that if the stop was illegal, then 
the warrantless search of the trunk is also illegal. 
POINT IV AND V 
THE TRIAL JUDGE'S FAILURE TO SPECIFY THAT THE 
OFFICERS ACTED IN BAD FAITH IS NOT FATAL, 
ALTERNATIVELY, THE FINDINGS BY THE TRIAL COURT 
ON THIS ISSUE ARE NOT REQUIRED AT ALL IF THIS 
COURT FIND THAT RULE 12(g) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
AND IN VIOLATION OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
FOURTH AMENDMENT, IN THAT IT SETS A LOWER STANDARD 
THAN THE MINIMUM SET BY THE UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT. 
The Attorney General argues that the trial court in failing 
to make specific findings regarding Rule 12(g)(1) at the suppression 
hearing and its later refusal to do so upon the motion to reconsider 
amounts to the trial court's ignoring the specific requirements 
of the rule and therefore is fatal to the finding that the trial 
court made when it suppressed the evidence. 
This view of the trial court's ruling and the evidence elicited 
at the motion to suppress ignores the conduct of the Border Patrol 
officers in the manner in which they stopped the vehicle and their 
alleged reasons for doing so. 
To require such technical "niceties" from a trial court judge 
when the evidence is abundantly clear that the conduct of the 
officers involved was egregious and both the reasons they had for 
stopping the vehicle and the manner in which it was stopped is 
ludicrous. 
The Attorney General argues at some length about the effect 
of United States v. Leon, 104 Supreme Court 3405 (1984) , in which 
that court fashioned an objective "good faith" exception to the 
exclusionary rule, recognizing that that case specifically involved 
a case in Burbank, California, in which a search warrant was relied 
upon by the officers making the arrests and seizures. 
In discussing Leon, supra, and indicating that the Utah Supreme 
Court has never ruled upon the constitutionality of its "good faith" 
exception, refusing to do so in the State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 
the Attorney General seems to be inviting this court to so rule in 
this case. 
However, the Attorney General is reduced to citing to this court 
the case of United States v. Williams, 622 F2d 830 (5th Circuit 1980) , 
a case that predated Leon by four years, and then by some unknown 
extension of logic argues that the "good faith" exception to warrant-
less searches should be applied ab initio vis a vis Williams, supra, 
which to say the least is puzzling. 
In the Williams case, supra, the defendant was arrested by a 
federal narcotics agent for violating a court imposed travel restric-
tion imposed as a condition of bail while the defendant was awaiting 
trial. 
The officer had personal knowledge that the condition of travel 
had been imposed, and therefore when he stopped her acted in good 
faith on the belief that her bail conditions remained in force and 
that therefore she was in violation of a statute. 
The subsequent incidental search of the defendant produced the 
heroin which was the subject of the later prosecution. 
This case turned simply on whether or not the officer in making 
the arrest for an alleged "contempt of court" in that the defendant 
had violated her conditions of release on a federal case was made in 
"good faith" or whether it was made in a bad faith intent to harass 
the defendant or for other reasons. 
The court discussed certain forms of "technical violations" made 
in good faith when the officers relied on a statute that is later 
declared unconstitutional or as in the Williams case on a reasonable 
interpretation of the statute that is later construed differently 
(the Contempt Statute), the court observing, that the exception applies 
only if the police belief is both bonafide and reasonable. Suppression 
will still result if the officers allege a good faith belief in a 
"law so grossly and flagrantly unconstitutional that any person of 
reasonable prudence would be bound to see its flaws", or in a law that 
violated a "controlling precedent that it was. . . unconstitutional." 
Quoting from Michigan v. Defillipo, 443 US at 38, 99 Supreme Court at 
2632. 
In any event, Rule 12(g)(2) states that a search or seizure shall 
in all cases be deemed substantial if one or more of the following is 
established by the defendant or applicant by a preponderance of the 
evidence: 
(i) The violation was grossly negligent, willful, 
malicious, shocking to the conscience of the 
court or was a result of the practice of the 
law enforcement agency pursuant to a general 
order of that agency; 
(ii) The violation was intended only to harass 
without legitimate law enforcement purposes. 
Rule 12(g)(3) states as follows: 
In determining whether a peace officer was acting 
in good faith under this section the court shall 
consider in addition to any other relevant factors 
some or all of the following; 
(i) The extent of deviation from legal search and 
seizures standards; 
(ii) The extent to which exclusion will tend to 
deter future violations of search and seizure 
standards; 
(iii)Whether or not the officer was proceeding by 
way of a search warrant, arrest warrant, or 
relying on previous specific directions of a 
magistrate or prosecutor; or 
(iv) The extent to which privacy was invaded. 
(v) If the defendant or applicant establishes that 
the search and seizure was unlawful and sub-
stantial by a preponderance of the evidence, 
the peace officer or governmental agency must 
then, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
prove the good faith actions of the peace officer. 
It would appear from the evidence elicited at the motion to 
suppress that the defense proved to the satisfaction of the trial 
judge that the violation by the Border Patrol officers was at once 
negligent, willful, shocking to the conscience and was a practice 
of law enforcement agency (Border Patrol) pursuant to the general 
order of that agency, that the officers did not act in good faith 
in that the deviation from legal search and seizures standards was 
substantial and it was obvious from the exclusion order that at 
least the Border Patrol will be on notice to deter future violations 
of the law in these areas, that the officer was not acting pursuant 
to a warrant of any kind, and that the extent of privacy that was 
invaded was substantial. 
On the other hand, the county prosecutor put on no evidence to 
show that the Border Patrol officers acted in good faith, just the 
contrary was shown by the evidence. 
The Attorney General cites another case to this court INS v. 
Lopez-Mendoza, 104 Supreme Court 3479 (1984), as a basis for the 
Attorney General's theory that the good faith extension of Leon should 
be applicable to warrantless searches. 
INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, supra, had to do with a deportation 
proceeding, a civil action to determine eligibility to remain in the 
United States, and the issue was whether or not the issue of an 
illegal arrest of the alien could be raised to block the proceeding 
which was seeking to deport him. 
The Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule does not 
apply in a deportation hearing, that hearing being civil in nature, 
any reference to "good faith" in that case was purely dicta and 
had nothing to do with the issues nor the holding. 
It is .respondent's position that the trial court was not required 
to make specific findings on the record to avoid the sanctions of 
Rule 12(g),rather those findings are clear by implication in the trial 
court1s suppression order and also from the evidence it heard prior to 
making that order. 
This court's position in the State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 
1103 Utah (1985),(supra), indicates clearly that this court will not 
address the constitutionality of an issue i.e. statute rule, etc., if 
the case can be decided on other grounds. 
It is respondent's suggestion that this court does not have to 
inquire into the validity i.e. constitutionality of Rule 12(g), in 
that the case can be decided very simply on the basis of the arguments 
made regarding the stop, etc.. 
If however, the court decides to rule on the validity of Rule 12(g) 
then this court must realize that the standards set in Rule 12(g) are 
much lower than those set out by the United States Supreme Court. 
Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution made 
applicable on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, no state can 
set standards for compliance with Fourth Amendment protections that 
are lower than those set by the United States Supreme Court. See 
United States v. Robinson, 414 US 218, and Gustafson v. Florida, 414 
US 260 (1973), and also the discussion in People v. Brisendine, 13 
Cal3d 528, 545, in which the California Supreme Court discussed the 
applicability of Gustafson and Robinson, supra, as being binding on 
the California Supreme Court (This was a pre 1982 case prior to 
California's Proposition 8 Initiative) and viewed the federal cases 
as being the minimum standards required in order to satisfy the 
Fourth Amendment proscription of unreasonable searches. 
United States Supreme Court in Cooper v. California. (1967) 
386 US 58, 52, recognized the well-known principle that a state can 
impose higher standards on Fourth Amendment issues than that required 
by the Federal Constitution if it chooses to do so, but not lower 
standards. 
It seems abundantly clear in the case at bench that the conduct 
complained of by the Border Patrol officers was an illegal stop, search, 
interrogation under federal law, but to require a lower standard by 
reason of the mandates of Rule 12(g) by a finding of "bad faith" on 
the part of the arresting officers clearly imposes a lower standard 
than that required by the United States Supreme Court and its 
decisions. 
This writer is aware of no case which has extended the "good 
faith" principle of Leon, supra, applicable to warrant searches being 
extended to warrantless searches. 
The Attorney General invites this court to do so in its constru-
ing of Rule 12(g), however, respondent as stated above urges both that 
the court not engage in that analysis because it does not have to and 
secondly, if the court feels it must, that it must gauge that analysis 
by Fourth Amendment standards as set by the United States Constitution 
and the applicable Supreme Court decisions in that area. 
POINT VI 
THE BORDER PATROL AGENTS HAD NO LEGAL AUTHORITY 
TO STOP THE MUSTANG WITH OR WITHOUT A REASONABLE 
SUSPICION OR PROBABLE CAUSE; THEY WERE NEITHER 
PEACE OFFICERS OF THE STATE OF UTAH AS DEFINED 
IN THAT STATE'S CODE NOR WERE THEY AUTHORIZED 
BY FEDERAL LAW TO STOP VEHICLES MORE THAN 100 
MILES FROM ANY CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES BORDER. 
The Utah Laws of Criminal Procedure, Section 77-2-1, specifies 
what constitute a Category III peace officer and in Sub-Section (d), 
specifies federal officers recognized as peace officers in the State 
of Utah. 
Although Utah recognizes special agents of the United States 
Customs among others there is no recognition of officers of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) of which the Border 
Patrol officers are employees. 
Therefore, quite simply, the Border Patrol officers were not in 
the State of Utah pursuant to any request by any sheriff or others 
in authority in the State of Utah, not having any authority to make 
arrests under Utah law for any violation of law and not being 
authorized to perform border patrol functions more than 100 miles 
from the border pursuant to rules set out by the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (See 8 CFR Chapter One, Section 287) 
(Appendix 1 attached)• 
It it clear from the Code of Federal Regulations and also 
Title 8, Section 1357 of the Immigration Act (See Appendix 2) that 
the Border Patrol officers were many hundreds of miles from either 
the Canadian or Mexican border when they elected to stop respondents 
on Interstate 15 on the night in question. 
Clearly there was no showing by the prosecution that anyone in 
Utah with authority requested them to be there, that there is no evi-
derice that the district director (of the INS) that, in his opinion, 
there was a necessity for having Border Patrol agents more than 100 
miles from the external boundary of the border and that therefore, 
in the absence of such direction by the director of INS (which would 
be questionable to say the least) the Border Patrol officers were 
acting without the authority of any Utah mandate and without the 
authority of the United States Government when they stopped the 
defendants/respondents. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the above reasons this court should affirm the trial 
court's order suppressing the evidence. 
Respectfully submitted this 20th day of March, 1986. 
JO^Jj^E. MEYERS 
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent 
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Board w -in 15 days after the mailing 
of the notification of decision as pro-
vided in Part 3 of this chapter 
(Sees. 103. 239. 254. 255. 256. 271. 273 and 
280. 8 U S C 1103. 1229. 1284. 1285. 1286. 
1321.1323 and 1330) 
[22 FR 9808. Dec 6. 1957, as amended at 23 
PR 9124. Nov 26, 1958. 46 PR 28624. May 
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PART 282—FORMS FOR SALE TO 
PUBLIC 
8 282.1 Forms printed by the Public Print-
er. 
The Public Printer is authorized to 
print for sale to the public, the forms 
listed in $ 299.3 of this chapter. 
(Sec. 103. 66 Stat . 173. 8 U S.C 1103) 
[45 PR 6777. Jan. 30. 1980] 




287 2 Criminal violations, investigation and 
action 
287 3 Disposition of cases of aliens arrested 
without warrant. 
287 < Subpoena* 
287 5 Power and authority to administer 
oaths 
287 6 Proof of official records. 
AUTHORITY Sees 103, 235. 236 242, 287 66 
Stat. 173. 198. 200. 208. as amended, 23a, 8 
U S C . 1103. 1225, 1226, 1252. 1357 
§ 287.1 Definition*. 
(a)(1) External boundary The term 
"external boundary," as used in sec-
tion 287(a)(3) of the Act, means the 
land boundaries and the coast line of 
the United States, including the ports, 
harbors, bays and other enclosed arms 
of the sea along the coast, and a mar-
ginal belt of the sea extending three 
geographic miles from the outer limits, 
of the land that encloses an arm of 
the sea. 
(?tet^iraiap<iminrflilgwin » The term 
"reasonable distance," as used in sec-
tion 287(a) (3) of the Act, means 
within 100 aif suits from any external 
boundary of the United States or any 
shorter distance which may be fixed 
by the district director, or, so far as 
8 <*** Ch. « (l-l-as Edition 
is concernea «*ny distance fixed purtu* 
*nt to paragraph (b) of this section. 
(b) Reasonable dutance; fixing fey 
district directors. In fixing" distance* 
riot exceeding 100 air miles pursuant 
vo pw^grapY* \*> oi tons section, dis-
trict directors shall take into consider-
ation topography, confluence of art* 
fies of transportation leading from ex* 
ternal boundaries, density of popula-
tion, possible inconvenience to tht 
traveling public, types of conveyances 
vised, and reliable information as to 
rnovements of persons effecting illegal 
^ntry into the United States: PmpUb& 
jd, That whenever in the opinion of % 
district director a distance in his dis-
trict of more, Lhatt,JL0O~air miles^ from 
^ny external boundary of the United 
States W4>uid-because of unusual etr-
^uxnstances be reasonable, such dis-
trict director shall forward a complete 
feport with respect to the matter to 
the Conuniaaumef , who p*ay, if he de-
termines that such action is justified, 
declare such distance to be reasonable 
(c) Exercise of power by immigration 
Officers. Any immigration officer is 
hereby authorized to exercise any-
where in the United States all the 
powers conferred by section 287 of the 
Act. 
(d) Disposition of felony cases. The 
cases of persons arrested for felonies 
under paragraph (4) of section 287(a) 
ol the Immigration and Nationality 
Act shall be handled administratively 
in accordance with the applicable pro-
visions of § 287.2 but in no case shall 
there be prejudiced the right of the 
person arrested to be taken without 
unnecessary delay before another 
near-by officer empowered to commit 
persons charged with offenses against 
the laws of the United States. 
(e) Power i a arr**t persons who 
pnTia^Jmnspoti. or hotter emtoin 
aliens, o- %nducm them to enter. Any 
immigration officer shall have author-
ity to make arrests for violations of 
an, provision of section 274 of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act. 
m ?Ot7oUi»*theb<mier* The phrase 
"patrolling the border to prevent tne 
illegal entry of aliens into the United 
states" as used in section 287 of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act 
insane conducting such activities a* 
*s^ <^ vu^ tt\&£^ , <w w*&fei\a&& and nee-
"APPENDIX 1 " 
1 £ ( * • itlon and Notur« ition Service, Justice § 287.4 f^ary, to prevent the illegal entry of f S i into the United States. 
fofc'lH 9W*» Dtc* e» l W 7 » ** wnended al 29 !Si»44.8cpt.24.1964) 
I07J Criminal violations; investigation 
, r tod action. 
l^benever a district director or chief 
itrol agent has reason to believe that 
Sere has been a violation punishable 
fflfer any criminal provision of the 
fevs administered or enforced by the 
gBrvice, he shall cause an investigation 
(0 be made immediately of all the per-
tfrmpt facts and circumstances and 
gall take or cause to be taken such 
further action as the results of such 
investigation warrant. 
JJ5FB16362. Oct. 20,1970] 
igtfj Disposition of cases of aliens ar-
$J rested without warrant. 
? 4p.likiya«**t*rt> without-a warrant 
6f arrest under the authority con-
tained in section 287(a)(2) of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act shall be 
j:>oamined as therein provided by an 
'Officer other than the arresting offi-
\ etr, unless no other qualified officer is 
; readily available and the taking of the 
* alien before another officer would 
** entail unnecessary delay, in which 
*' event the arresting officer, if the con-
& duct of such examination is a part of 
J the duties assigned to him, may exam-
n toa the alien. If such examining offi-|,cw U satisfied that there is prima 
S facie evidence establishing that the ar« 
wrested alien was entering or attempt-
?£to« to enter the United States in viola-
t i o n of the immigration laws, he shall 
a
 t *eter the case to an immigration judge Jg. tor further inquiry in accordance with 
a* Parts 235 and 236 of this chapter or 
Jg take whatever other action may be ap-
m Propriate or required' under the laws |> <* other regulations applicable to the 
¥ Darticular case. If the examining offi-| . cer is satisfied that there is prima 
- «cie evidence establishing that the ar-
4^ jested alien is in the United States in 
?f violation of the immigration laws, fur-
l> ther action in the case shall be taken 
• •• Provided in Part 242 of this chapter. 
if *r t n e e x a m i m n & officer has deter-
ge mined that formal proceedings under 
F;S?iUons 236' 237* o r 2 4 2 o f t n e A c t » IkJ**** be instituted, an alien arrested 
without warrant of arrest snail be ad-
vised of the reason of his arrest and 
his right to be represented by counsel 
of his own choice, at no expense to the 
Government. He shall also be provided 
with a list o( the available free legal 
services programs qualified under Part 
292a of this chapter and organizations 
recognized pursuant to § 292.2 of this 
chapter, located in the district where 
his deportation hearing will be held. It 
shall be noted on Form 1-213 that 
such a list was provided to the alien. 
He shall also be advised that any 
statement he makes may be used 
against him in a subsequent proceed-
ing and thai a decision wUKbe~mad#* 
within 24 hours or less as to whether 
he will be continued in custody or re-
leased on bond or recognizance. Unless 
voluntary departure has been granted 
pursuant to § 242.5 of this chapter, the~-» 
alien's-cas^ shall be presented prompt*** 
ly„ and in any event within 2^ hours,-
to the district director, acting-district 
director, deputy district director, as* 
sistant district director for investiga-
tions, officers in charge at Agana, GU; 
Albany, NY; Charlotte Amalie. VI; 
Cincinnati, OH; Hammond, IN; Mil-
waukee, WI; Norfolk. VA; Oklahoma 
City, OK; Pittsburgh, PA; Providence, 
RI; Salt Lake City. UT; St. Louis, MO; 
Spokane, WA for a determination as 
to whether there is prima facie evi-
dence that the arrested alien is in the 
United States in violation of law and 
for issuance of an order to show cause 
and warrant of arrest prescribed in 
Part 242 of this chapter 
C22 FR 9808, Dec 6. 19S?r as amended at 32 
FH 6260, Apr. 21. 1967; 44 FR 4654, Jan. 23, 
1979; 44 FR, 15996, Mar. 16. 1979 J1 
§ 287,4 Subpoena. 
(a) Who may issue—(1) Prior to com-, 
rnencement of proceedings. Except as 
provided in 5 335.11 of this chapter, 
subpoena requiring the attendance of 
witnesses or the production of docu-
mentary evidence, or both, may be 
issued by a district director upon his 
own volition prior to the commence-
ment of a proceeding. 
<2) Subsequent to commencement of 
proceedings. In any proceeding under 
this chapter, other than under Part 
335 of this chapter, and in any pro-
')fjq 
APPENDIX 2 
8 § 1 3 5 6 IMMIGRATION Ch. 12 
Croas R e f e r e n c e * 
Definition of the term-— 
Alien, see section 1101 fa) (3) of this title. 
Service, set* aectiun 1101(a) (34) of this title. 
§ 1 3 5 7 * POWCTS of immigration officers and employees— 
Powers without warrant 
(a) Any officer or employee of the Service authorized under regu-
lations prescribed by the Attorney Genera! shall have power without 
w a r r a n t -
CD to interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien 
as to his right to be or to remain in the United States; 
(2) to arrest any alien who in his presence or view is entering 
or attcmptinsr to enter the United States in violation of any law 
or regulation made in pursuance of law regulating the admis-
sion, exclusion, or expulsion of aliens, or to arrest any alien in 
the United States, if he has reason to believe that the alien so 
arrested is in the United States in violation of any such law or 
regulation and is likely to escape before a warrant can be ob-
tained for his arrest, but the alien arrested shall be taken with-
out unnecessary delay for examination before an officer of the 
Service having authority to examine aliens as to their right to 
enter or remain in the United States; 
(3) within a reasonable distance from any external boundary 
of the United States, to board and search for aliens any vessel 
within the territorial waters of the United States and any rail-
way car, aircraft, conveyance, or vehicle, and within a distance 
of twenty-five miles from any such external boundaiy to have 
access to private lands, but not dwellings, for the purpose of 
patrolling the border to prevent the illegal entry of aliens into 
the United States; and
 t ' 
(4) to make arrests for felonies which have been committed 
and which are cognizable under,any law of the United States 
regulating the admission, exclusion, or expulsion of aliens, if 
he has reason to believe that the person so arrested is guilty of 
such felony and if there is likelihood of the person escaping be-
fore a warrant can be obtained for his arrest, but the person 
arrested shall be taken without unnecessary delay before the 
nearest available officer empowered to commit persons charged 
with offenses against the laws of the United States. Any such 
employee shall also have the power to execute any warrant or 
other process issued by any officer under any law regulating 
the admission, exclusion, or expulsion of aliens. 
422 
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Ch. 12 POWERS OF OFFICERS 8 § 1357 
Adminis trat ion of oatht t a k i n g of ev idence 
(b) Any officer or employee of the Service designated by the At-
torney General, whether individually or as one of a class, shall have 
power and authority to administer oaths and to take and consider 
evidence concerning the privilege.of any person to enter, reenter, 
pass through, or reside in the United States, or concerning any mat-
ter which is material or relevant to the enforcement of this chapter 
and the administration of the Service; and any person to whom such 
oath has been administered, under the provisions of this chapter, 
who shall knowingly or willfully give false evidence or swear to any 
false statement concerning any matter referred to in this subsection 
shall be guilty of perjury and shall be punished as provided by sec-
tion 1621 of Title 18. 
Search wi thout warrant 
(c) Any officer of employee of the Service authorized and desig-
nated under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General, whether 
individually or as one of a class, shall have power to conduct a 
search, without warrant, of the person, and of the personal effects in 
the possession of any person seeking admission to the United States, 
concerning whom such officer or employee may have reasonable 
cause to suspect that grounds exist for exclusion from the United 
States under this chapter which would be disclosed by such search. 
June 27, 1002, c. 477, Title II, ch. 9, § 287, 66 Stat. 233. 
Historical Note 
Leg Istntltct HUtory. For U'k'MuUvi! nea VJW1 U 8,('«>dfl Cong and Ad in Newt, 
history and purpose of Act June 27 1052, p 1653 
C r o s s i t o f o r o n o o s 
Definition of the term— 
Allen, see section 1101(a) (3) of this title. 
Attorney General, soe section 1101(a) (5) of this title. 
Entry, see section 1101(a) (13) of this title. 
Immigration officer, see section 1101 (a) (18) of this title. 
Service, see section 1101(a) (34) of this title; 
United States, see section 1101(a) (38) of this title 
Felony classified as sn offense punishable by death or imprisonment for a terra 
exceeding one yeur, see section 1 of Title 18, Crimes and Criminal Procedure. 
L i b r a r y R e f e r e n c e s 
Aliens <§=>44 C J S Aliens 55 80. S3 
Searches and Seizures £=»3.3, 7(11). C J S Searches nnd Seizures If 18, 80 et 
fleq. 
N o t e s o f D e c i s i o n s 
Authority of officers 4 
Constitutionality 1 
Construction 2 
Custodial Interrogation 10 
l>u« process 8 
423 
Generally 4 
Arrest without warrant 
Generally 12 
Escape, likelihood of IS 
Probable cause 14 
